17 July 1944 2040 GCT

NAME AND RANK OF PILOT: GENELBRACHT, H. M., Jr., Ens.
SERVICE AND GROUP: AVN USNR
ORGANIZATION: American Export Airlines, Inc.
DATE OF PILOT RATING: FLYING EXPERIENCE (YEARS):
HRS. THIS MODEL LAST 3 MOS: TOTAL HOURS: 2418 (800) (1x.52)
PREVIOUS ACCIDENT RECORD: D
INJURIES: None

NAME AND RANK OF OTHER PERSONNEL		INJ.
ANDERSON, Frederick H.,	1st officer	D
STOUT, Floyd P.,	1st Engineer	D
OGLE, George M.	Navigator	D
GARDNER, Claud L.	1st Radio	D
BENNETT, Dudley J.	3rd Officer	D
ENGLE, Gail M.	Ass't. Engr.	D
BRANDT, Robert H.	Ass't. Radio	D
PREZALAR, Stephen T.	Purser	D

AIRCRAFT CLASS: V-B
MODEL AND NUMBER: PB2Y-3R No.7225

DAMAGE	A	B	C	D	E	M
AIRPLANE				X		
ENG. 1						
ENG. 2						
ENG. 3						
ENG. 4						
ENG. 5						
ENG. 6						

REMARKS: 3' hole 2" wide in port side of keel ending a few in. forward of the step.

NATURE OF ACCIDENT: H

PERCENTAGE EACH CAUSE: 90% PE 10% Misc(airport terrain). PP.

LOCATION: Lough Neagh
PURPOSE OF FLIGHT: Schedule
FLYING OR LANDING CONDITIONS: None; Unl.; N.; E. 8 kts.; day; clear; contact clearance; sea level; taxiing. A contributing factor is fact that markers in use at time of accident were, under certain conditions of light, very difficult to see.

NH-42 struck rock while taxiing.
NH-42 left mooring with only 1 eng. started.
NH-42 failed to keep in contact with Launch.
U.S. charts not adequately marked.

Plane left the mooring, taxied inside of the 6' line as shown on the charts. A rocket was fired by the accompanying RAF launch at which time the Captain altered his course to taxi outside the 6' line, but before reaching the line, the aircraft struck a rock, tearing a 3' hole about 2" wide in the port side of the keel, ending a few inched forward of the step. The Board has reached the following conclusions:

1- The pilot's technique, in leaving a mooring with but one engine started, was faulty.

2- Charts available in the Route Manual, copies of which are attached, indicate clearly the shoal water in this area. It thus appears that the pilot had neglected to familiarize himself with the features of this chart.

3- The pilot was not in direct communication with the accompanying RAF launch. He had been advised by the ATC Briefing Officer to stand by on another frequency. We feel, however, that regardless of instructions he may have received from any source, he displayed poor judgment in not remaining in direct contact with the launch since his radio permits him to do this.

4- The investigation reveals that cockpit organization in this instance was not of the best. The

U. S. NAVY
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS AIRCRAFT TROUBLE ANALYSIS (over) T
FORM B, AER. 330-A

YEARS	MONTH	DAY	PILOT'S NAME
	17 July 1944	2040 GCT	

FLYING EXPERIENCE

HOURS FLYING EXPERIENCE

NAME AND RANK OF PILOT GESELBRACHT, H. M., Jr., Ens.

SERVICE AND GROUP AVN USNR

ORGANIZATION American Export Airlines, Inc.

DATE OF PILOT RATING _____ FLYING EXPERIENCE (YEARS) _____

HRS. THIS MODEL LAST 3 MOS. _____ TOTAL HOURS 2418 (800)

PREVIOUS ACCIDENT RECORD _____ (12.58)

INJURIES None D

NAME AND RANK OF OTHER PERSONNEL		INJ.
ANDERSON, Frederick H.,	1st officer	D
STOUT, Floyd P.,	1st Engineer	D
OGLE, George M.	Navigator	D
GARDNER, Claud L.	1st Radio	D
BENNETT, Dudley J.	3rd Officer	D
ENGLE, Gail M.	Ass't. Engr.	D
BRANDT, Robert H.	Ass't. Radio	D
PREZALAR, Stephen T.	Purser	D

T

AIRCRAFT: CLASS VPB

MODEL AND NUMBER PB2Y-3R N-7223

DAMAGE	A	B	C	D	E	M
AIRPLANE				x		
ENG. 1						
ENG. 2						
ENG. 3						
ENG. 4						
ENG. 5						
ENG. 6						

REMARKS

3' hole 2" wide in port side of keel ending a few in. forward of the step.

NATURE OF ACCIDENT H

PERCENTAGE EACH CAUSE

90% PE 10% Misc (airport terrain). PB.

LOCATION Lough Neagh

PURPOSE OF FLIGHT Schedule

FLYING OR LANDING CONDITIONS None; Unl.; U.; E, 8 kts.; day; clear; contact clearance; sea level; taxiing. A contributing factor is fact that markers in use at time of accident were, under certain conditions of light, etc., difficult to see.

NH-42 struck rock while taxiing.
NH-42 left mooring with only 1 eng. started.
NH-42 fail to keep in contact with launch.
U-4 shoals not adequately marked.

Plane left the mooring, taxied inside of the 6' line as shown on the charts. A rocket was fired by the accompanying RAF launch at which time the Captain altered his course to taxi outside the 6' line, but before reaching the line, the aircraft struck a rock, tearing a 3' hole about 2" wide in the port side of the keel, ending a few inched forward of the step. The Board has reached the following conclusions:

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FORM N. AER. 339-A

First Officer testified that during this particular period he was engaged in tuning the radio receivers. We feel that this should have been done before the aircraft left the mooring. The Captain likewise was engaged at this time in starting the remaining 3 engines. His attention thus being diverted from the more important task of remaining aware of the position of his aircraft with respect to surrounding obstructions.

Steps taken: More adequate markings of shoals, obstructions, etc., has been established. More extensive briefing of plane commanders is being instituted.

There is some doubt apparent in the minds of all operations personnel at Lough Neagh as to the definite location of shoal water, obstructions, etc., and it is felt that in view of this fact all personnel concerned should exercise extreme care in all surface maneuvering of aircraft.